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Abstract
The present study investigates the role of tax practitioners in
the tax reporting process. Previous research is extended by incor-
porating endogenously determined taxpayer uncertainty about tax lia-
bilities and by investigating the potential information transfers that
occur when taxpayers hire tax practitioners in a strategic setting.
We analyze taxpayers' incentives to hire tax practitioners and iden-
tify conditions under which there are information transfers. Addi-
tionally, we consider the effects that hiring tax practitioners have
on the tax agency's audit policies and tax revenue collections. We
find that taxpayers who hire tax practitioners do not necessarily
report lower tax liabilities than taxpayers who prepare their own tax
returns and that the tax rate has a greater impact upon the demand for
tax practitioners than does the penalty rate. We also find that the
expected tax liabilities reported by taxpayers who hire tax prac-
titioners will not necessarily decline. However, the expected mone-
tary transfers to the tax agency (on a post-audit basis) will decline
for taxpayers who hire tax practitioners and for taxpayers who file
their own tax returns.

1. INTRODUCTION
Taxpayer reporting behavior has been the focus of numerous ana-
lytical and empirical studies. One issue that has received attention
in recent research is taxpayer uncertainty about tax liabilities (see
Aim [1988], Beck and Jung [1989a, b], and Scotchmer and Slemrod [1989]).
Generally, these studies have found that exogenous increases (decreases)
in the level of tax liability uncertainty will result in higher
(lower) levels of reported income or less (more) aggressive reporting
2
by taxpayers. One limitation of these studies, however, is that they
do not incorporate the role of tax practitioners in the tax reporting
3process.
Tax practitioners could impact the tax reporting process in a
variety of ways. First, one would expect that, based on their tech-
nical knowledge of tax laws and regulations, practitioners would be
able to reduce if not resolve taxpayers' uncertainty about tax liabil-
ities. Further, when representing the tax reporting/auditing process
as a noncooperative game (due to the opportunities for strategic
interdependencies [Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 1986]), the presence
or absence of a tax practitioner's signature on a taxpayer's return
could provide an additional source of information upon which the tax
enforcement agency's audit policies could be conditioned (see Erekson
and Sullivan [1988] and Scotchmer [1989]). To the extent that tax-
payers anticipate an effect on the audit probability, their reporting
strategies, in turn, also could be expected to change.
In the present study, we incorporate interdependencies between
taxpayers' reporting decisions and the tax enforcement agency's audit
-2-
policies by employing the sequential equilibrium concept developed by
Kreps and Wilson [1982]. Previous research is extended by allowing
the level of taxpayer uncertainty to be determined endogenous Ly , based
4
on taxpayers' decision to hire tax practitioners. Several noteworthy
results are obtained from the ensuing analysis. First, we identify
conditions under which the decision to hire practitioners can effec-
tively signal taxpayers' private information to the tax enforcement
agency. When demand exists for practitioners, we find that there will
be no tax evasion (i.e., deliberate understatement of tax liabilities)
and that if taxpayers have incentives to evade taxes, there will be no
demand for tax practitioners.
Another finding is that, contrary to casual intuition, our analy-
sis suggests that some taxpayer types will not hire tax practitioners
even if there is no fee charged for their services. We also find that
the average amount of taxable income reported by taxpayers who utilize
practitioners will not necessarily be lower than the average income
reported by other taxpayers. However, on a post-audit basis, the
average value of taxes and penalties collected by the tax agency will
decline when taxpayers hire practitioners. Moreover, the average
post-audit revenue collections from taxpayers who choose not to hire
practitioners are also shown to decline when other taxpayers hire tax
practitioners. Hence, the hiring of tax practitioners by one group of
taxpayers creates a positive externality for taxpayers who prepare
their own tax returns. Another result is that the tax rate has a
greater impact on the demand for tax practitioners than does a penalty
rate increase.
-3-
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In
Section 2 we present a benchmark model for an economy where there are
no practitioners available for hire by taxpayers. This is followed in
Section 3 by the introduction of tax practitioners who can resolve tax-
payers' liability uncertainty before making their tax reporting deci-
sion. Section 4 presents the conclusions and policy implications of
our analysis.
2. TAX REPORTING WITHOUT PRACTITIONERS
In this section, a benchmark is established for subsequent analy-
sis by initially modelling the tax reporting/auditing game in a sim-
plified economy in which there are no tax practitioners available for
hire. After introducing our modelling assumptions, the possible
equilibria are characterized and sufficient conditions are identified
to ensure their existence.
Taxpayers are assumed to have private Information about their
taxable income and associated liability based on the first-hand knowl-
edge of their own circumstances and transactions. Given their incom-
plete information about the tax law, however, taxpayers are uncertain
about their tax liabilities. In particular, taxpayers must decide
which of two possible tax liabilities (denoted by tL and tH) to report
where L < H and t is the proportional tax rate. Such uncertainty
might arise, for example, if taxpayers do not know whether an expen-
diture is tax deductible. However, given their private information,
taxpayers assess a probability, p, for the event that their tax
liability is tH and 1-p for the tL tax liability. Since taxpayers'
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circumstances and factual information differ, we assume that their
beliefs also differ and, thus, denote their type by "p." The (prior)
distribution of taxpayer types within the audit class is modelled by
the probability density f(p) having [0,1] support and mean,
1
p = / pf(p)dp. This density reflects the tax agency's beliefs about
taxpayer types based on prior (demographic) information.
While taxpayers must decide which of the two possible tax liabil-
ities to report on their tax returns, the tax agency must decide
whether or not to perform an audit. A variety of audit strategies may
be employed. For example, in the United States, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) relies primarily on two strategies. First, under the
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), the IRS selects a
representative sample of tax returns from the population with the goal
of gathering information regarding the accuracy of returns (see
Erelcson and Sullivan [1988] and footnote 10 below). The second audit
strategy uses the information gathered from TCMP to develop discrimi-
nant functions (DIF) which are employed to guide the selection of most
returns to be audited. Unlike TCMP audits, the tax returns selected
by DIF are based upon the probability of significant tax changes and
are sensitive to taxpayers' reports. Hence, the DIF screening process
can be viewed as a form of strategic auditing in that the selection
probability depends upon the characteristics of the taxpayer's return
(see Erekson and Sullivan [1988]).
In the present study, we simplify model development by focusing on
strategically based auditing and by assuming that the tax agency's
audit decision is based upon the criterion of revenue maximization,
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net of costs. In particular, the tax agency compares the expected
audit benefit (i.e. , additional tax and penalty revenue) with the
associated investigation cost denoted by c and audits when the former
exceeds the latter. Consistent with previous research (see Reinganura
and Wilde [1988b] and Beck and Jung [1989b]), we assume that the tax
agency knows the cost (c) of investing, but is uncertain about the
actual benefit to be realized from an audit. In contrast, taxpayers
do not know the cost of investigating and, instead, assess a probabil-
ity distribution, G(c) , having [cT ,cu ] support.L n
The audit strategy adopted in our model differs from the strategy
employed in previous tax practitioner modelling studies (e.g. , Klepper,
Mazur, and Nagin [1988] and Scotchmer [1989]) wherein the tax agency
is assumed to precommit to an (optimal) audit strategy. In our model-
ling context, such precommi tment would preclude the tax agency's capi-
talizing ex-post on the information that is signalled through tax-
payers' reports. Thus, by avoiding precommi tment , subgame perfectness
(sequential rationality) is obtained.
Another modelling assumption concerns the outcome from the audit
process. While we recognize that, in some cases, ambiguity in the tax
law could create disagreement among tax experts, we simplify herein by
assuming the existence of a well-defined tax liability. Specifically
we assume that experts (tax agency and tax practitioners) have the
ability to determine unambiguously actual tax liabilities based upon
the factual information provided by taxpayers.
The monetary transfers from taxpayers to the tax agency depend
upon the tax agency's audit decision, the taxpayer's report, and the
-6-
audit outcome. If the tax agency decides not to perform an audit,
then the payments by taxpayers to the tax agency will be equal to the
liability reported on the tax returns. Likewise, when an audit is
performed, the amount ultimately transferred to the tax agency will be
based on the audit finding. When the amount reported by taxpayers is
found to be less than the liability determined by the audit, then tax-
payers will have to pay additional taxes and penalties on the under-
payment. Assuming that a taxpayer reports tL, but the actual tax
liability is tH, then taxes of tH would have to be paid in addition to
a monetary penalty of q(tH-tL), where q is the proportional penalty
rate. Table 1 below summarizes the possible expected monetary trans-
fers from taxpayers to the tax agency.
Insert Table 1 here
Before characterizing the equilibrium strategy several preliminary
observations are relevant. First, if taxpayers report tH, then the
expected value of monetary transfers to the tax agency would decline
if an audit were to be performed. As auditing is costly, the tax
agency's best response to all taxpayer types who report tH is not to
audit. Second, as taxpayers possess private information and move
first in the game, their reporting strategies may transfer the infor-
mation (i.e., taxpayer types) to the tax agency. Since the expected
audit benefit depends on the taxpayer types who would report tL, the
tax agency will revise its expectation about taxpayer types prior to
making audit decisions.
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Now suppose that the tax agency were to conjecture that all tax-
payer types having p-values below p* will report tL, while the other
taxpayer types will report tH. Given this conjecture, if the tax
agency receives a tax return upon which tL is reported, the tax
agency's revised expectation about taxpayer types who report tL is
P*
p = / [p/F(p*) ]f (p)dp. Hence the expected value of the tax collec-L
tions from such taxpayers would be
c* i p*
L
• k, (1)
where k = t(l+q)(H-L).
Now consider taxpayers' reporting decisions. As the tax agency's
optimal response will be to perform an audit when c* > c, taxpayers
who report tL on their tax returns should anticipate being audited
with probability, G(c*). Thus, type p taxpayers who report tL would
ultimately expect to pay the tax agency:
(l-G(c*))(tL) + G(c*)[(l-p)tL+p(tH+q(tH-tL))] =
tL + p[G(c*)(l+q)t(H-L)]. (2)
Alternatively, if taxpayers report tH, the tax agency will not
perform an audit so the ultimate payment to the tax agency will be
1 ^ . ..«. . .
_ ._ — . .... . , ..„ . , . , , . . _
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taxpayer's best response will be to report tL when:
tL + p[G(c*)(l+q)t(H-L)] < tH. (3)
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Note that the left hand side of (3) is monotone increasing in p,
thereby, justifying the tax agency's conjecture about p*. Further,
the inequality (3) also can be expressed as:
G(c*)p(l+q) < 1. (4)
Given the tax agency's conjecture about p* , a sequential equil-
ibrium herein requires that the tax agency's audit strategy is opti-
mal. Further, given the tax agency's audit strategy, taxpayers'
reporting decisions should be optimal (i.e. , minimize the expected
transfer to the tax agency), and taxpayers' optimal reporting deci-
sions should be consistent with the tax agency's conjecture about the
types who would report tL. The equilibrium essentially requires that
the inequality in (4) must hold for all taxpayer types whose p-values
are less than p* , i.e.,
p* • G(c*) = (1+q)"1 . (5)
We now present the following theorem regarding the existence of
sequential equilibria for the game:
Theorem 1 :
1. If G(c)(l+q) > 1 where c = p^k, then there exists a partially
separating (sequential) equilibrium which is characterized by a unique
p* such that < p* < 1.
2. If G(c)(l+q) < 1, then a low-pooling (sequential) equilibrium
arises in which all taxpayer types report tL.°
Proof
:
(See the Appendix.)
-9-
Intuitively, Theorem 1 indicates that the combined deterrent
effect of auditing and penalties must exceed a threshold level in
order for a separating equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, there will be
a low-pooling equilibrium in which all taxpayer types report tL. In
the separating equilibrium characterized by (5), taxpayers' reports
will effectively signal to the tax agency whether their p-values are
above or below p*. Such information enables the tax agency to revise
its expectation regarding the benefit of auditing taxpayer types who
report tL and, thereby, refine its audit policies. However, in the
low-pooling equilibrium, taxpayers' reports provide no additional
information to the tax agency.
An issue raised by the above analysis is whether the introduction
of tax practitioners would provide further information to the tax
agency and how tax auditing policies would be affected. In the
following section, we extend the model to include tax practitioners.
3. EQUILIBRIUM WITH TAX PRACTITIONERS
Model development is facilitated by making several simplifying
assumptions. First, given the existence of a well-defined tax liabil-
ity, we assume that tax practitioners, using their technical knowledge
of the tax laws and factual information provided by taxpayers, are
able lo resolve all Lax liability uncertainty. Further, we assume
that this ability is common knowledge to taxpayers and the tax agency.
Hence, it is reasonable to characterize the market for tax prac-
titioners' services as competitive. Accordingly, we denote the com-
petitively determined fee by F and further assume that it is exogenous
to our model.
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Given the common knowledge assumption, tax practitioners would be
unable to develop a defense against the severe criminal penalties
assumed to be in existence for co-signing tax returns that are known
9
to be in error. Accordingly, we simplify by assuming that tax prac-
titioners would be unwilling to participate in tax evasion. Given
this condition, the tax agency would not expect the taxpayer's actual
liability to differ from the amount reported on the taxpayer's return
when signed by a tax practitioner and, since auditing is costly, there
would be no incentive to audit these returns. It should be noted,
however, that taxpayers still could face the possibility of non-
strategically based (e.g.
,
TCMP) audits and that the threat of this
possibility is essential in discouraging tax practitioners from par-
ticipating in tax evasion.
While tax practitioners in our model are unwilling to sign a return
known to be in error, taxpayers could still have incentives to commit
tax evasion. The latter could arise because, unlike tax practitioners,
taxpayers might be able to avoid fraud penalties by pleading ignorance
of the tax law due to their uncertainty. Under such conditions, tax-
payers could ignore the advice given by tax practitioners and file
their own returns. The possibility of tax evasion will be considered
in the next subsection.
After obtaining information from tax practitioners, taxpayers'
posterior probabilities will be either one or zero depending upon
whether the tax practitioner determines that the tax liability is tH
or tL. Furthermore, the (predictive) probabilities associated with
the tax liability determination are equal to the prior probabilities
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corresponding to the two tax liabilities. Hence, the (pre-posterior)
expected benefit of hiring tax practitioners will be equal to the
difference between the expected value of monetary transfers to the tax
agency without a practitioner and those made when a practitioner is
hired.
The actual calculation of the expected benefit of hiring practi-
tioners is somewhat more subtle than initially may be apparent. In
particular, a taxpayer's decision to hire practitioners could provide
additional information to the tax agency when hiring incentives vary
with taxpayer types. Since the incremental information will depend
upon the nature of the benchmark, equilibrium, we consider both separ-
12
ating and low-pooling benchmark equilibria.
3.1 Separating Benchmark Equilibrium
Given the tax agency's audit incentives discussed above, it is
important to identify the types of taxpayers who would report tL with-
out hiring tax practitioners, since the tax agency will conduct audits
only on those taxpayers. Suppose the tax agency conjectures that all
taxpayers of type p e [0,P ] would report tL and not hire tax prac-
titioners and that the remaining types would consist of those who hire
tax practitioners and those who report tH and do not hire. This
conjecture is plausible since caxpayers with smaller p-vaiues would
have stronger incentives to report tL (see the benchmark equilibrium).
Further, as will become apparent shortly, the benefit of hiring tax
practitioners is a monotone increasing function of p for low p type
taxpayers. Given this conjecture, the tax agency's optimal audit
strategy is to conduct an audit when tL is reported on a tax return
-12-
without a tax practitioner's signature and the audit cost (c) is
smaller than the expected benefit (c ), i.e.,
3
=
r
P
a f(p)pdp
.C < C
a
~ J
n
F(p ) k * (6)
U a
Thus, the audit probability anticipated by taxpayers who report tL
without tax practitioners' signatures will be G(c ). We now make the
a
following observation:
Observation 1: P < p*.
a —
The basis for the observation is as follows: Suppose to the
contrary that P > p*. Then, the tax agency's conjecture about P
3 3
indicates that a type p* taxpayer would report tL. However, P > p*
3
implies that G(c ) > G(c*) (i.e., the audit probability is higher than3
in the benchmark.) and, thus, that it is now optimal for a type p* tax-
payer to report tH. As these two implications are inconsistent with
each other, it must be the case that P < p*. This observation leads
'
a —
r
to G(c ) < G(c*).
a —
The benefit of hiring a tax practitioner is equal to the reduction
in the expected payments to the tax agency. When a practitioner is
hired, the reported tax liability will be accurate. Therefore, as
penalties will be avoided, the expected payment to the tax agency made
<yj a. *-y y& p taxpayer ±&
(l-p)tL + p • tH, (7)
since there Is a probability, p, of being informed by a tax practi-
13
tioner that the actual tax liability is tH.
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The analysis of the benefit of hiring tax practitioners is facili-
tated by introducing the following notation. Let P (<1) be such that
p
G(c
n
) • (1+q) = 1, where c = / ? P v P • k. Note that the
U
monotonicity of G(') ensures the existence of a unique P (<p*) as
long as G(c) • (1+q) > 1 (i.e.
,
provided that the separating benchmark
equilibrium in Theorem 1 obtains). Consider now a type p taxpayer who
would report tL if a tax practitioner were not hired (i.e. , a taxpayer
for whom G(c )p(l+q) < 1). The benefit of hiring a tax practitioner
3
for such taxpayer is denoted by
B(p|tL) - tL + G(c )pt(l+q)(H-L) - [ (l-p)tL+ptH]3
= p[G(c )(l+q)-l]t(H-L). (8)
3
Observation 2: P„ < P .
— a
The reason for the observation is as follows: Suppose to the con-
trary that P < P . Then the benefit (8) will be negative,
a
However, given an audit probability, G(c ) (<G(c*)), there always
a —
will exist some taxpayer types, say p > P , who would report tL and
a
thus would obtain the benefit of hiring tax practitioners given by
(8). The negativity of this benefit would lead such taxpayer types
not to hire tax practitioners (but to report tL). This, however,
wwua-u urz iin.ULiaxai.ciii. wxuil llic IdX dgenCy o luhjCllulc Liiau i_a.ft.paj >_ ». o
of type p > P would either hire tax practitioners or would not hire
3
but report tH. Hence, P must be greater than P., that is,
a °
G(c )(l+q) - 1 > 0.
3
Since P > p the benefit of hiring tax practitioners in (8) is a
monotone increasing function of p. Given that tax practitioners charge
-14-
a fee denoted by F for their services, taxpayers would purchase their
services when B(p|tL) > F. We now define a sequential equilibrium for
the model of tax practitioners.
Definition : An equilibrium is characterized by P (where
3
P„ < P < p*) such that, given the tax agency's conjecture about P
a
o^j
a
(i.e., the anticipated audit probability is G(c )), all taxpayers
a
of type p <^ P do not hire tax practitioners and report tL, and tax-
payers of type p > P would either hire tax practitioners or not hire3
but report tH.
The equilibrium requires (i) taxpayers' strategies to be optimal
given the tax agency's audit strategy represented by G(c ), (ii) that
a
the tax agency's audit strategy is optimal given its belief about tax-
payer types, and (iii) that the tax agency's beliefs are consistent
with taxpayers' optimal behavior. Given the raonotonicity of B(p|tL),
the sequential equilibrium in the current context requires that
B(P ItL) = F. (9)
a
'
Condition (9) says that for taxpayers of type p < P (> P ), the
3 3
benefit of hiring tax practitioners is smaller (higher) than the cost,
F. An issue of immediate interest is whether or not such an equilib-
rium exists.
Theorem 2 : There exists a unique sequential equilibrium as described
in the definition if
F < p* ' [G(c*)(l+q)-l] * t(H-L). (10)
Proof
:
(See the Appendix.)
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The intuition for Theorem 2 is provided by noticing that the RHS
of (10) represents the benefit of hiring tax practitioners for a type
p* taxpayer when the tax agency's conjecture is such that all tax-
payers of type p _< p* will report tL without hiring tax practitioners
(see B(p|tL) in (8)). Since the benefit is monotone increasing in p
(_< p*), the RHS of (10) represents the maximum potential benefit to
any taxpayer type. The theorem states that, as long as the fee
charged by tax practitioners is less than this maximum benefit, there
will be some taxpayer types hiring tax practitioners in equilibrium.
Thus, it should be apparent that if the inequality (10) is reversed, a
trivial equilibrium would be obtained in which no taxpayers hire tax
practitioners and all taxpayers of type p < (>) p* report tL (tH)
(i.e., P = p*). Thus, we essentially return to the separating bench-
mark equilibrium, except that tax practitioners are available and no
one has incentives to hire them. Further, the tax agency's conjecture
(i.e., P = p*) is consistent with such taxpayers' optimal strategies.
3
Since we have identified the equilibrium condition we now can
describe the equilibrium in more detail. Note first that, in equil-
ibrium, G(c )(l+q)-l > 0. This ensures that there always exists a
unique taxpayer type, say P (< 1), for whom
b
GU
a
JP
b
U+q) - 1 = U. (11)
The equation (11) suggests that taxpayers of type p > P would report
tH if they chose not to hire tax practitioners (see the condition (4)).
Thus, the benefit of hiring practitioners for such taxpayers would be
-16-
B(p|tH) - tH - [(l-p)tL+ptH] = (l-p)t(H-L) for p > p (12)
— b
which is monotone decreasing in p. Given (12), one should recognize
that the benefit of hiring practitioners is B(p|tL) for taxpayers of
type p < P, . Using (11), one can show that
— b
B(P, |tL) = P, [G(c )(l+q)-l]t(H-L)
b b a
= P
b
(l/P
b
-l]t(H-L)
= (l-P
b
)t(H-L) = B(P
b
|tH). (13)
Thus, the benefit function is continuous in p, and the benefit becomes
maximal at p = P . This, combined with the equilibrium condition
b
B(P ItL) = F, implies that P < P, . Further, the negative monotonicity
a a b
of B(pltH) ensures that there exists a taxpayer of type P (> P, ) such
c b
that
B(P tH) - F. (14)
c
We now describe the equilibrium:
Proposition 1 : When the condition (10) in Theorem 2 holds: (i) tax-
payers of type p _< P do not hire tax practitioners but report tL,
(ii) type P <. P <. P hire tax practitioners, and (iii) type p >_ P
do not hire tax practitioners but report tH.
Figure 1 below depicts the equilibrium characterized in Proposition
1. Note that both benefit functions are linear in p and intersect at
the point P, where the benefit is maximal. A type P, taxpaver would
b b
be indifferent between reporting tL and tH if a tax practitioner were
not hired. The intersections between the benefit functions and the
-17-
fee line serve to define an interval [P ,P ] of taxpayer types for
a c
whom the hiring of tax practitioners results in a positive net
benefit. Taxpayer types having more extreme p-values, however, will
not hire tax practitioners as the net (of fee) benefit will be
negative.
Insert Figure 1 here
Several comparative statics properties of the equilibrium are now
analyzed. Consider first the demand for tax practitioners. Given our
characterization of taxpayer types, a convenient measure of demand is
provided by the interval width [P ,P ]. Two comparative statics prop-
3. C
erties of the demand for tax practitioners are now identified:
Proposition 2 : An increase in either the penalty or tax rate will
result in greater demand for tax practitioners. However, an increase
in the tax rate will have a greater impact upon demand than a corre-
sponding increase in the penalty rate.
Proof : (See the Appendix.
)
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is straightforward. There
are two types of reporting errors possible. The first, underpayment
of taxes, results in the incurrence of a penalty cost, while the
second, overpayment of taxes, results in the payment of unnecessary
taxes. An increase in the penalty rate raises the cost of an under-
payment error to taxpayers, but has no effect on the cost of an over-
payment error. Hence, the incentive to reduce the cost of underpay-
ment errors by hiring practitioners increases for low p type taxpayers
-18-
who previously would not have hired and reported tL. However, an
increase in the tax rate elevates the cost of both underpayment and
overpayment errors, so that more high p taxpayer types as well as low
p taxpayer types would be induced to hire practitioners.
Another similar comparative statics result arises with respect to
the fee charged by tax practitioners. As for other normal goods, the
demand for tax practitioners' services is inversely related to the
fee. One interesting feature of our model, however, is that even if
tax practitioners were to charge no fee for their services, not all
taxpayer types would buy the services. In particular, even if the
cost of hiring tax practitioners were zero, taxpayers of type p < P
would not hire tax practitioners. This is because, once such taxpayer
types start hiring tax practitioners, the benefit of hiring becomes
negative. The following proposition states this result and a formal
proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 : Some taxpayers would not purchase the services of tax
practitioners even if they are free goods.
Proof : (See the Appendix.)
An important assumption of the above equilibrium is that taxpayers
who hire tax practitioners always report consistent with the advice
which they receive. One might argue, however, that taxpayers have the
option of disregarding the advice given by tax practitioners when they
are told to report tH and can report tL without a tax practitioner's
signature. Since the tax agency cannot effectively distinguish such
taxpayers from others who have not hired tax practitioners and choose
-19-
to report tL, the presence of uncertainty enables taxpayers to avoid
tax evasion penalties. Under such conditions the possibility of tax
evasion would appear to exist. However, under the present equi-
librium, taxpayers would not report tL when they know for certain that
their actual tax liability is tH, because it is optimal for all
taxpayer types having p-values greater than P (<1) to report tH.
Thus, in order to investigate the possibility of tax evasion, we must
consider a low-pooling benchmark equilibrium in which it is initially
optimal for all taxpayer types to report tL.
3.2 Low-Pooling Benchmark Equilibrium
Recall that we have obtained the low-pooling benchmark equilibrium
when G(c")(l+q)
_^
1. Under this condition, G(c )(l+q) j< 1 for any
P < 1, and hence the benefit of hiring tax practitioners, B(pltL), is
a —
non-positive for all taxpayer types. Thus, under the tax agency's
conjecture (similar to its conjecture in the separating benchmark
equilibrium), the following is the only possible equilibrium: no tax-
payer types hire tax practitioners' services, but all report tL. This
behavior is not only optimal but also is consistent with the tax agen-
cy's conjecture that P = 1, since B(p|tL) = p [G(c) (1+q )-l ] t(H-L) _<
3. mmm
and reporting tL is optimal for all taxpayer types when G(c)(l+q)
_< 1.
l«AO a. i. guuiC Ub uma y j-uau <-/Ti^, U <*/ OliopCCC i_ m <a u o Cult GutiC" cCujC^wui.--
entertained by the tax agency could be consistent with certain tax-
payers' behavior to hire tax practitioners (i.e., B(p|tL) > F for cer-
tain taxpayers). Note first that the hiring benefit B(p|tL) would be
positive only when [G(* )(l+q)-l] > 0. Under the low-pooling benchmark
-20-
equilibrium condition, [G( * )(l+q )-l ] could be positive only if the tax
agency entertains the conjecture that taxpayers of type p e [P,,P
d e
(where < P, < P < 1) would not hire tax practitioners and report tL.
a e —
Hence, the anticipated audit probability is G(c,) where c, =
a a
/
S
wn n ^'wS ^ * k» such that [G(c ,)(l+q)-l] > 0. Note that thisJ F(P ) - F(P ,
)
d
p e d
conjecture implies that, given G(c,), taxpayers of type p < P, would
either hire tax practitioners or not hire but report tH. This conjec-
ture, however, cannot be consistent with taxpayers' optimal behavior.
This is because (i) given that taxpayers of type p £ t^j»P 1 report
tL, any taxpayer of type p < P would also report tL, and (ii) the
benefit of hiring tax practitioners B(p|tL) is monotone increasing in
p, and thus if taxpayers of type p e [0,P,] hire tax practitioners,
all taxpayer of type p e [P,»P ] would also hire. The foregoing
analysis leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 : If G(c)(l+q)
_< 1 (i.e., if the low-pooling benchmark
equilibrium obtains), then the following is a (trivial) sequential
equilibrium: no taxpayer types hire tax practitioners (i.e., no
demand for their service exists) and all taxpayers report tL (i.e.,
P = 1).
a
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. In the low-
pooling benchmark equilibrium, it is optimal for all taxpayer types
(including the one with p = 1) to report tL. This suggests that, as
long as the tax agency's audit probability remains the same as in the
benchmark equilibrium, all taxpayer types would not change their
reporting decisions (i.e., reporting tL) even if they were told that
their true tax liabilities were tH. This invariance of optimal report-
ing decisions would make worthless the information to be provided by
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tax practitioners (given the same audit probability, G(c~)), and hence,
tax practitioners would not be hired. Further, if no taxpayer types
hired tax practitioners, the information structure in the game would
remain unaltered, and so would the tax agency's audit probability.
Therefore, the equilibrium described in Proposition 4 would be
obtained.
Note that, in contrast with the previous separating equilibrium,
taxpayers in a low-pooling equilibrium potentially could have incen-
tives to disregard tax practitioners when they are told to report tH.
While this would appear to admit the possibility of tax evasion,
Proposition 4 shows that, under the low-pooling conditions, taxpayers
would not have an incentive to hire tax practitioners. Hence, once
again, we find that no tax evasion occurs in equilibrium.
3.3 Payments to the Tax Agency
Having identified conditions under which there will be demand for
tax practitioners, we now investigate the effect of tax practitioners
on monetary transfers between taxpayers and the tax agency. In
concept, such comparisons could be made either on a pre-audit or post-
audit basis. The former represents the effect on the tax liabilities
voluntarily reported by taxpayers, while the latter represents the
Louai value of resource collections available for spending on public
14
goods. Casual intuition suggests that monetary transfers made by
taxpayers who hire tax practitioners will decline on both a pre-audit
and post-audit basis, while the transfers made by taxpayers who do not
hire tax practitioners will be unaffected. However, each supposition
is only partially true.
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Proposition 5 : The expected tax liabilities voluntarily reported by
taxpayers who hire tax practitioners can either increase or decrease,
but the post-audit monetary transfers made by these taxpayers will
unambiguously decline. The pre-audit expected tax liabilities re-
ported by taxpayers who do not hire tax practitioners will be un-
affected, but the post-audit monetary transfers from these taxpayers
also will decline.
Proof ; (See the Appendix.)
Two aspects of Proposition 5 are noteworthy. First, the differ-
ence between the effects of tax practitioners on pre- and post-audit
monetary transfers suggests that the distinction between the two
is potentially important. This distinction has not been recognized in
prior research which has focused on the reported tax liabilities.
Second, by sorting themselves out through reliance on tax practi-
tioners, Proposition 5 shows that a positive externality is provided
for taxpayers who choose not to hire tax practitioners. This latter
result is in contrast with much of the signalling literature in which
high quality types impose a negative externality on the low quality
types.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The present study has extended previous models of tax reporting
under conditions of uncertainty by allowing taxpayers to have oppor-
luualico Lu nxie Lc*a |JldCLllxuueiai Gut diidiybis inuiLdLes liuu, j.u
order for demand to exist for tax practitioners, it must be the case
that some taxpayers would otherwise have incentives to forego taking
questionable deductions (i.e. , report tH). Other findings are that
the demand for tax practitioners is influenced to a greater extent by
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the tax rate than the penalty rate and that some taxpayers would not
have incentives to hire practitioners even if their services were
costless. Furthermore, there is no tax evasion in our model when
demand for tax practitioners exists and, when taxpayers do in fact have
incentives ex post to ignore the advice provided by tax practitioners,
no demand will exist.
The study also analyzed the effect of tax practitioners on reported
tax liabilities and on post-audit revenue collections made by the tax
enforcement agency. One noteworthy result is that, even when there are
no budget constraints to induce rationing by the tax agency, the
hiring of practitioners by a subset of taxpayers results in a lower
audit probability and lower post-audit revenue collections from tax-
payers who choose not to hire tax practitioners. Two related results
have direct empirical implications. In particular, our analysis pre-
dicts that, ceteris paribus
,
the average voluntarily reported tax
liabilities of taxpayers who hire tax practitioners will not be sys-
tematically lower than among taxpayers who prepare their own tax
returns. However, on a post-audit basis the average tax and penalty
payments are predicted to be lower among taxpayers who hire tax prac-
titioners.
Several possible extensions of the present analysis are possible.
One extension would be to incorporate other taxpayer motivations for
hiring practitioners including a reduction in return preparation and
audit costs (see Reinganum and Wilde [1988a]). In related work, the
authors have found in a model in which there are two types of tax-
payers, that the presence of audit cost savings can create incentives
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for taxpayers to hire practitioners but then disregard their advice.
We speculate that similar equilibria also could exist where there is a
continuous distribution of taxpayer types. Another extension worthy
of further attention would be to consider environments in which tax
practitioners and the tax agency are unable to resolve uncertainty
about taxpayers' liabilities. Under such conditions, uncertainty
could be resolved through litigation.
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Footnotes
In addition, Milliron [1985] also has investigated empirically
the effects of tax liability uncertainty on taxpayers' reporting
decisions, while Ayres et al. [1988] have examined the impact of tax
practitioners' judgments on taxpayer reporting.
2These results appear to be quite robust with respect to modelling
assumptions and have been obtained in both decision-theory models
under taxpayer risk aversion (see Aim [1988], Beck and Jung [1989a],
and Scotchmer and Slemrod [1989]) and game-theory models under
taxpayer risk-neutrality (see Beck and Jung [1989b]).
3
The importance of tax practitioners is underscored by recent
Internal Revenue Service Data indicating that approximately 50 percent
of all individuals' tax returns in the United States are co-signed by
professional return preparers [Roth, 1988, p. 111].
4
This contrasts with previous models in which the uncertainty
level has been exogenous (e.g., Shavell [1988], Scotchmer [forth-
coming] and Beck and Jung [1989a]) and with other models in which tax-
payers have no uncertainty about their tax liability (e.g., Klepper,
Mazur and Nagin [1988] and Reinganum and Wilde [1988a].
Where no well defined tax liability exists, the tax agency's
position regarding an appropriate report would stand unless the tax-
payer chose to litigate. Since litigation is costly, however, such
actions are not often taken by taxpayers. In addition to litigation,
in limited circumstances, taxpayers may request advance rulings from
the IRS (see Lee [1987]). As the litigation-bargaining is quite
complex, the issue of ambiguous tax liabilities is left for future
research.
In the United States, understatement penalties ( Internal Revenue
Code Section 6661) are assessed if the taxpayer has no "substantial
authority" for their reporting position or fails to disclose all rele-
vant facts relating to the uncertain reporting position. The meaning
of "substantial authority" is ambiguously defined in the law, so that
in practice, uncertainty may surround the application of a penalty in
situations where a taxpayer reports tL and the audit outcome is tH.
Such uucei i_aiiiLy does iiul signif icanLly aifeci our results.
7
As characterized in our model, penalties in the United States are
generally a function of the difference in tax liability paid with the
return and tax liability due according to the tax agency.
To make the equilibrium sequential in the sense of Kreps and
Wilson [1982], out-of -equilibrium beliefs should be specified for tax-
payer types who might report tH, even though no taxpayer types actually
would report tH in a low-pooling equilibrium. In our model, however,
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the equilibrium is not sensitive to such specification, because the
tax agency's optimal strategy is never to audit taxpayers who would
report tH.
9
In the United States, tax practitioners who willfully prepare a
fraudulent return for a taxpayer are guilty of a felony and the
penalties imposed under the law ( Internal Revenue Code Section 7206)
include a maximum fine of $100,000 (or $500,000 in the case of a
corporation) together with the cost of prosecution, and imprisonment
for a maximum of 3 years. In addition, for the majority of tax
practitioners found guilty of tax fraud, their right to practice
before the IRS will likely be suspended and they may be enjoined from
preparing tax returns in the future ( Internal Revenue Code Section
7407), thereby losing their livelihood.
Recall that the benefit of auditing taxpayer types who report tH
without tax practitioners' signatures would be negative, while the
benefit of auditing tax returns that are co-signed by tax practitioners
would be zero.
If there were no possibility that returns signed by tax practi-
tioners would ever be audited, then tax practitioners could have in-
centives to participate in the evasion despite the existence of severe
monetary and criminal penalties. In the U.S. environment, however,
taxpayers (and practitioners) still would, at a minimum, face the
threat of a TCMP audit. It should be noted that TCMP audit selection
is not affected by the presence of a tax practitioner's signature on
the return nor by a previous audit at a district office (see Erekson
and Sullivan [1988]). The reason for not excluding taxpayers whose
returns were previously audited is to provide the tax agency with
further information about the effectiveness of audits performed by
personnel in district offices. In any event, such audit policies pro-
vide support for modelling the probability of a non-strategic (viz.,
TCMP) audit as exogenous, having no effect on the expected benefit of
hiring practitioners.
12
A high-pooling equilibrium cannot exist in our modelling
framework. Note that, given the continuous distribution of taxpayer
types f(p) on [0,1], some taxpayers will have arbitrarily small
p-values. Since penalties are assumed to be bounded and the audit
probability is less than unity due to audit costs, there always will
De some taxpayer types for whom reporting tL will be optimal.
13
Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that taxpayers
who are told by their tax practitioners that their actual tax liability
is tH (with a probability of one) will in fact report tH. Recall that,
given a separating benchmark equilibrium, reporting tH is optimal for
all taxpayers whose p-values exceed p*. Hence, reporting tL in this
situation would be inconsistent with the assumption of a separating
benchmark, equilibrium. Had a low-pooling benchmark equilibrium been
assumed, however, then even taxpayers who assess a unitary probability
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for the tH outcome would have incentives to report tL. This possi-
bility is considered in Section 3.2.
14
Previous models of taxpayer reporting have focused upon how
changes in the tax rates, progressivity
,
penalty rates, and the uncer-
tainty level affect the amount of taxable income reported by taxpayers.
As the audit probability has been exogenous in most studies, the
effect upon ex post tax revenue collections would not be expected to be
different. Other studies employing a game-theory framework, such as
Reinganum and Wilde [1988a] and Beck and Jung [1989b] also have
retained a similar focus upon the taxable income or tax liability
reported by taxpayers.
Recall that the expected monetary transfers are calculated at a
point in time before the tax agency observes the cost realization cor-
responding to a particular taxpayer. After observing the cost realiza-
tion, a taxpayer's return will be audited with probability of one
(zero) when the cost realization is less (greater) than the expected
audit benefit.
If a non-transferable audit cost a were incurred in the event of
a taxpayer audit then the expected value of total savings from relying
upon a tax practitioner in the low-pooling equilibrium would increase.
In particular, the benefit would become:
B*(p|tL) = oG(c) + p[G(c")(l+q)-l]t(H-L).
Note that, due to the presence of the aG(c) term which represents the
expected value of audit cost savings, the modified B*(p|tL) function
is_no longer monotonically decreasing in p and negative even when
G(c)(l+q) - 1 < 0. Accordingly, the possibility of a low pooling
equilibrium in which taxpayers hire tax practitioners, but then condi-
tionally disregard their advice is no longer precluded. Due to the
absence of monotonicity , however, we have been unable to establish the
existence of such an equilibrium in the present modelling context.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 :
The LHS of (5) is continuous and monotone increasing in p* with
its value equal to zero and G(c), respectively when p* = and p* = 1.
The RHS of (5) is a positive constant less than one. Accordingly,
given the condition G(c)(l+q) > 1, there exists a unique value of p*
satisfying (5) such that < p* < 1.
Under the condition G(c)(l+q) ! 1, reporting tL would be optimal
for all taxpayer types. Hence, a low-pooling equilibrium will exist.
Proof of Theorem 2 :
From the equilibrium condition (9) and the benefit definition in
(8),
P [G(c )(l+q)-l]t(H-L) - F (Al)
a a
The LHS of (Al ) is zero when P = P., is monotone increasing in P
,
a (J a
and becomes p* [G(c*)(l+q)-l] t(H-L) when P = p*. In contrast, the RHS
of (Al ) is a positive constant. Therefore, given (10), there exists a
unique P satisfying the equilibrium condition.
3 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 :
From (Al)
P [G(c )(l+q)-l] = F/t(H-L). (A2)
a a
Further, from Equations (14) and (13),
(1-P ) = F/t(H-L). (A3)
c
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An increase in q increases the LHS of (A2), but has no impacts on the
RHS of (A2), nor on both sides of (A3). Thus, the new equilibrium P
a
must decline in order to restore the equilibrium equation (A2).
However, P will not be affected. In contrast, an increase in t will
c
decrease the right hand sides of both equations (A2) and (A3). Hence,
the new equilibrium P must decrease, while the new equilibrium P
^
a
^
c
should go up. Since the demand for tax practitioners is defined as
(P -P ), the demand will increase as q or t increases. But, the in-
c a
crease in the demand will be greater in response to an increase in t.
Proof of Proposition 3 :
When F = 0, it follows from (A2) that
P [G(c )(l+q)-l] = 0. (A4)
a a
From (A4), it must be the case that
P = 0, (A5)
a
or [G(c )(l+q)-l] = 0. (A6)
a
Since any P < P cannot be consistent with an equilibrium, (A5) is
a
ruled out. The equation (A6) is equivalent to
a (J
The equation (A7) implies that taxpayers of type p e [0,P n ] would not
hire tax practitioners (and report tL).
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Proof of Proposition 5 :
Pre-Audit Tax Collections
Consider first the average monetary transfers made by taxpayers on
a before audit basis. Note that taxpayers for whom p < P will not
a
hire tax practitioners and will continue to report tL as in the bench-
mark economy in which there are no tax practitioners. Similarly, tax-
payers for whom p > P will not hire tax practitioners and will
continue to report tH. Now consider the taxpayers who hire tax prac-
titioners. Note that taxpayers for whom p E [P
,
p* ] will pay expected
3
taxes of ptH + (l-p)tL with tax practitioners, rather than tL in the
original benchmark equilibrium. Since ptH + (l-p)tL > tL for
P*
P < p < p* it follows that / [ptH+(l-p)tL-tL] f (p)dp > 0. Hence, the
a
P
pre-audit tax collections from these taxpayers actually increase when
practitioners are hired. However, the opposite result holds with
respect to taxpayers for whom P < p < P . Note that tH > ptH + (l-p)tL
P
c
a C
for these taxpayers. Thus, / [ptH+(l-p)tL-tH] f (p)dp < 0. As the two
P*
integrals have opposite signs, the net effect upon total pre-audit tax
revenues is ambiguous unless specific assumptions are made about the
distribution of taxpayer types, f(p).
Post-Audit Monetary Transfers
uic cxpecieu uiuuetdty Li/aussieLS inaue by Laxpay t!Ls> iot whom
< p < p will continue to report tL as in the benchmark equil-
s
ibriura. However, as G(c ) < G(c), it follows that:
P
3
tL + /
a [G(c )-G(c*)]pkf (p)dp < implying that their expected tax
a
payments on a post-audit basis will decline. From the equilibrium
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condition (9) and the definition of B(p|tL) in (8) of taxpayer types
for whom P < p < p*, it follows that:
a
ptH + (l-p)tL < tL + G(c )pk. (A8)
3
Making use of the fact that G(c ) < G(c*), it follows by tran-
SI
sitivity that:
ptH + (l-p)tL < tL + G(c*)pk (A9)
for P < p < p*. Thus,
a
P*
/ [ptH+(l-p)tL-(tL+G(c*)pk]f(p)dp < 0.
P
a
Now consider the taxpayer types for whom p* < p < P . In the original
b
benchmark equilibrium, these taxpayers would have reported tH whereas
in the equilibrium with tax practitioners they pay taxes of ptH +
P,
(l-p)tL < tH for p* < p < Pu , so that /
D [ptH+(l-p)tL-tH] f (p)dp < 0.
P*
Finally, observe that all taxpayer types for whom p > P will not hire
b
tax practitioners, but will report the same tax liability, tH in both
equilibria. Hence, the expected value of post-audit monetary transfers
will decrease when taxpayers have the opportunity to hire tax practi-
tioners.
' Q.E.D.
Table 1
Expected Monetary Transfers Between Taxpayers and the Tax Agency
When There
Taxpayer Reports When Tax Agency Audits Is No Audit
tH ptH + (l-p)tL tH
tL p[tH+q(tH-tL)] + (l-p)tL tL
$F
B
B(p|tL) B(p|tH)
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
"P PL P 1
a b c
B: Benefit of hiring tax practitioners
p: Taxpayer type
F: Fee charged by tax practitioners
P : Taxpayer who is indifferent between hiring a practitioner and
reporting tL without hiring
P.: Taxpayer who would be indifferent between reporting tL and
reporting tH if a tax practitioner were not hired
P : Taxpayer who is indifferent between hiring a tax practitioner and
not hiring but reporting tH
Figure 1
Relationships Among Costs and Benefits of
Hiring Practitioners in Equilibrium
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